A: A number of relevant foreign policy policies in Washington have paved the way for U.S. efforts to remove its citizens from the ICC. On 6 May 2002, Marc Grossman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, announced that the current government was no longer bound by the signing of the Rome Statute and had no intention of ratifying the treaty. In May 2002, the United States for the first time threatened to destabilize UN peacekeeping operations by pledging its veto of the UN mission in East Timor if its military is not granted ICC immunity; exploitation has been extended without such a provision. On 12 July 2002, as part of the Security Council debate on the UN mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the United States was granted a one-year waiver for UN peacekeeping forces. (The agreement came into effect retroactively on July 1, 2002) On August 2, 2002, the last day before the summer recess of the U.S. Congress, President Bush signed the American Service Members` Protection Act, which authorizes the withdrawal of U.S. military aid from some non-NATO allies who support the tribunal. However, the law also provides for broad exceptions to the president.
A: Several versions of these bilateral agreements have been proposed so far: reciprocal agreements, provided that neither side abandons the “people” of the other without the prior agreement of the other. “are not reciprocal and only provide for the non-transfer of American “persons” to the ICC; And those that are intended for states that have not signed or ratified the Rome Statute, provided that those states do not cooperate with the efforts of third states to transfer American “persons” to the ICC. But even in this position of relative strength, the attack on an independent judicial institution to prosecute the most serious international crimes for which national systems had not done so was a bridge too far for many traditional American allies. None of the “five-eye” allies (the secret service partners of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) entered a BIA. Most European countries either: the European Union took a stand against these agreements, but not before Romania was the first state to sign an agreement (which seemed less surprising when it was learned that Romania had then hosted a black CIA transfer website). And while a number of African and Middle Eastern countries signed APIs, U.S. aid was largely limited to the minor caribbean and Central American nations. However, the fact that they are probably not effective does not mean that Bolton`s threat to pursue such agreements is empty. If the United States puts pressure on Member States to sign new BIAs, officials and civil society in those countries should remember that there are other options than a total rejection or simply the adoption of the United States.